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Introduction  
From discussions of Mr. Spectator as the ‘father’ of surveillance technology to those of 
Charles Dickens’s ‘Shadow’, critical inquiry into the usefulness of Michel Foucault’s 
disciplinary paradigm for our understanding of literary journalism has focused primarily on 
fantasies of omniscience, how these relate to an evolving urban society and their projection 
into narrative technique. Investigations have centred on the manner in which these journalists 
have sought to present the world to their readers and render it more knowable, and how in 
doing so they have encouraged the internalisation of certain social norms. I want to suggest 
an alternative relation between Foucault’s disciplinary paradigm and narrative technique in 
literary journalism, one in which the journalism under scrutiny is not a simple reflection of 
the new structures of power and governance that Foucault delineates, but rather can be seen in 
living relation to these structures, both enacting and resisting their role in creating a more 
transparent, disciplined society. Acknowledging of course the significance of the idea of 
omniscience to these writers and the texts, my focus is rather on the frequent use of the more 
limited, first-person perspective and how this relates to the journalist’s role in a disciplinary 
society.1   
Paul Saint-Amour notes that the omniscient fantasy amplifies ‘sight at the expense of 
touch, penetration at the expense of participation’, yet touch and participation are often as 
significant as sight in literary journalism.2 Certainly feeling plays a large part. For many of 
the journalists that I will be looking at, feeling is the key mode for resisting a passive and 
 disciplinary spectatorship, and yet it is also the most significantly disciplinary aspect of their 
texts. What I will call ‘emotional witnessing’ is fundamental to these writers’ journalistic 
mission, but it is a paradoxical enterprise: it pushes the reader and text beyond ‘knowability’ 
and yet in terms of the internalisation of normative standards and the creation of agents of 
self-discipline, the ultimate goal of Foucault’s disciplinary society, it is more effective than 
omniscience could ever be. Key to this is the nature of sympathy, which as we will see, can 
be a double-edged sword in a journalistic context.  
  
Foucault’s Disciplinary Paradigm  
To begin with then, what is Foucault’s disciplinary paradigm and how has it been related to 
literary culture and questions of narrative technique? In basic terms, Foucault’s contention is 
that the eighteenth century witnessed a radical alteration in the dynamics of governance and 
power. Up until the eighteenth century, power had been enacted physically on the body, 
usually in a public manner. Over the course of the century this shifts:   
[I]t is no longer the body, with the ritual play of excessive 
pains, spectacular brandings in the ritual of the public 
execution; it is the mind or rather a play of representations and 
signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the 
minds of all.3  
Power is exercised on the mind, and it is thus that disciplinary power emerges, as a system of 
control rather than punishment. Discipline regulates an individual’s actions and through his 
actions his mind, by marshalling his experience of space and time and by subjecting him to 
constant observation. In essence, it ‘trains’ him and in doing so it is productive rather than 
repressive:  
 [Discipline] does not link forces together in order to reduce 
them; it seeks to bind them together in such a way as to 
multiply and use them. Instead of bending all its subjects into a 
single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, 
carries its procedures of decompositions to the point of 
necessary and sufficient single units. It ‘trains’ the moving, 
confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a 
multiplicity of individual elements—small, separate cells, 
organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, 
combinatory segments. 4  
Rather than treating people as an undifferentiated mass then, ‘Discipline “makes” individuals; 
it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as 
instruments of its exercise’.5 Their individualism is key to their training, which for discipline 
to have truly taken effect, must have become internalised. In a disciplinary society, the 
individual becomes self-monitoring, their training so entrenched that it is a part of them, the 
observation that they have been submitted to so much a part of their life that they act as 
though they were observed even when not.  Observation, analysis, differentiation, 
individualisation and normalisation—these are the key components of disciplinary power, and 
of the institutions through which it works. Foremost of these for Foucault is the prison, but 
Foucault also references schools, hospitals, and factories, from which institutions disciplinary 
tactics spread outwards into wider society.  
For literary historians this outward spread includes literary culture and particularly one 
of the nineteenth century’s dominant forms, the realist novel. Focusing on the use of 
omniscient narration in nineteenth-century British and American fiction, Foucault-inspired 
 critics such as Jonathan Arac, Audrey Jaffe and D. A. Miller have discussed the connection 
between the rise of new methods of social surveillance and the omniscient narrator that 
dominates the narration of Victorian fictional life.6 Paying particular attention to public 
health, and the means of inspection and data collection used to fight the upsurge of infectious 
diseases caused by industrialisation and urbanisation, as well as the growth of the 
metropolitan police, these critics, like Foucault, have investigated how these surveillance 
methods extended beyond the specific arenas in which they were first deployed to society at 
large and specifically how the novel became a mode of surveillance and discipline, ‘educating 
its readerships to internalize the panoptical gaze of the omniscient narrator and thereby 
become part of the a morally self-policing citizenry’ and enacting ‘a fantasy of knowledge, 
mobility and authority’.7  
Though their focus is on the novel, they make it clear that in terms of narration and 
discipline, they see little to distinguish the novel from journalism. For D. A. Miller, Dickens’s 
novels are only ‘continuing (with only a considerable increase in cunning) the apologetics for 
the new forces of order that Dickens began as an essayist for Household Words’.8 Arac writes 
of how ‘imaginative writers and journalists joined politicians and those whom we now 
consider the founders of the social sciences in a common effort to comprehend the 
disturbances of their age and to organize them in a useful model’.9 While Jaffe comments that 
‘a similar tension between presence and absence, or personality and impersonality, appears in 
the structure of the panopticon’ as to that which can be seen in  
Dickens’s early journalism.10  
From the social-science perspective, although there is a tension between models of 
journalistic history based upon Habermas and those which look towards Foucault, it is 
generally accepted that   
 To the extent that the goal of journalism became, at least in part, 
to portray an increasingly populous and interdependent society 
to itself, it came to rely on strategies for tracking, describing 
and categorizing the populace—strategies related to the 
disciplinary drive for monitoring and the incitement to 
selfdisclosure.11  
In truth, the portrayal of society to itself has always been an intrinsic part of the journalistic 
mission. The increase in the desire to render society knowable and transparent, however, 
arose with the concurrent realisation that with urbanisation, and population growth in general, 
it was increasingly unknowable. As Miller, Arac and Jaffe point to, the fantasy of absolute 
transparency or omniscience is one rooted in the genesis of the modern city—its architecture, 
social practices and everyday dynamics. Indeed, as Gilbert Caluya writes, ‘For Foucault, 
techniques of government directly correlate to the emergence of the problematic of 
population’.12 The need to see and to pinpoint, to observe and categorise, is one that 
strengthened dramatically from the eighteenth century onwards—a need that has been seen to 
be answered in the detail of nineteenth-century realism and also the explosion of periodical 
literature during the same period, observing and recording society from every angle. This then 
is how Foucault has generally been related to the literary culture of the time and its narrative 
techniques.  
Alongside this view, however, I would like to place another. I would like to suggest 
that this drive towards knowability is not the full or only story, at least not in relation to 
journalism. Within that strand of journalism that has been called ‘literary’, transparency and 
the mapping of society is not an unproblematic endeavour. Like Lieutenant Yolland in Brian 
Friel’s Translations, the great literary journalists question as they map, and like Yolland, 
 throw the occasional sentimental obstacle in the way, in his case retaining old, untranslatable 
designations, in theirs, obscuring instead of categorising.13 Writers such as Joseph Addison, 
Richard Steele, William Hazlitt, Charles Lamb, William Makepeace Thackeray, Charles 
Dickens and his protégés, Tom Wolfe and his New Journalist cohorts question the 
perspectives they adopt when bringing the world before their readers. They may fantasise 
about omniscience, Dickens in particular, but they write from a limited, individualised 
viewpoint—the street level, rather than the panopticon.  Any detour into a bird’s eye view is 
soon queried. They eschew productivity in favour of idleness. They prefer digressive and 
circuitous narrative modes, and the point, when they come to it, if they come to it, is often 
buried under layers of irony. Meaning is frequently oblique and often uncertain. While vision 
plays a significant part in their self-identity as journalists, they also place emphasis on other 
senses, and beyond the physical senses, on the emotions. They do not simply record what they 
see, but their feelings and associations on witnessing what they see.  
Philip Davis in his exploration of the function of sentimentality in Victorian prose 
calls the emotion the reader feels on being presented with a scene of suffering ‘a secular 
bearing of witness’.14 Witnessing here goes beyond mere observation:  it involves an 
obligation to remembrance and a sense that as a witness one takes upon oneself the suffering 
that one sees. The journalist feels and the reader is called upon to feel with the journalist, a 
participant in the scene rather than just an observer. For the journalists and his readers, ‘[t]he 
horrors are no longer numbers, generalizations, abstractions, but are felt from the inside’.15 
This is the aim of much literary journalism, particularly in the nineteenth century—it seeks to 
move beyond a statistical analysis of society as vaunted by the Utilitarianism of the day, and 
which throughout modern history has been the mainstay of newspaper journalism, and 
through touching the emotions of its readers, thwart the notion that understanding can be 
achieved through the disciplinary dissection and analysis of society. It also however seeks to 
 move beyond a statistical analysis of society and through touching the emotions of its readers 
make them participants in the scene—to move them to action. It is often times didactic in 
nature and as such is, in essence, disciplinary, as it seeks to train and control the minds of its 
readers.  
This is not therefore a narrative of resistance in place of one of compliance, but rather 
one in which the texts under examination reveal writers aware of the complexities of their 
own role in society, and who simultaneously embrace and question that role, who may 
fantasise about omniscience but are less than certain about existing in a state of surveillance.  
  
The Limits of Omniscience  
‘The newspaper is not a lamp lighted by a single hand,’ wrote Anthony Trollope in 1865, ‘but 
a sun placed in the heaven by an invisible creator’.16 ‘Sir Oracle’ was a common term of 
mockery when papers sought to deride the perspective of their competitors.  Benedict 
Anderson has connected the newspaper with the ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ of the 
nation—‘a complex gloss upon the word “meanwhile”’.17 However, the newspaper does not 
maintain a horizontal relationship either with society or with its readership. From before 
Edmund Burke’s characterisation of the press as ‘the fourth estate’ in 1787, it cast itself as 
outside of events looking in, an objective overseer of society—whether that was the truth or 
not. Nor in the standard news report, which makes up the bulk of a daily publication, is the 
reader regarded on terms of equality, rather the reader is simply treated as a passive recipient 
of information. The gaze of the great national dailies is panoptic: ceaselessly watching from 
above.  
Literary journalism’s home has never been the newspaper but rather the single-essay 
periodical, the review and the miscellany—publications that are partial, small-scale and in 
 some cases inherently dialogic. Nonetheless, for the journalists writing in these publications, 
omniscience remains a touchstone of the journalistic experience. The access to and 
knowledge of all walks of society that it represents is a fantasy revisited again and again by 
numerous writers.  Scott Paul Gordon suggests that we view ‘Mr. Spectator as a “father” of 
surveillance technologies’.18 John Hollingshead in ‘First-Floor Windows’ travels London on 
the top of an omnibus, looking in first-floor windows, and ‘[f]rom this position I have seen 
you’ he tells the reader, ‘I have watched you [...] I have gazed upon you’.19 In brainstorming 
ideas for a new periodical, Charles Dickens wants ‘to suppose a certain Shadow, which may 
go into any place, by sunlight, moonlight, starlight, firelight, candlelight, and be in all homes, 
and all nooks and corners, and be supposed to be cognisant of everything, and go 
everywhere’.20 Asmodeus, the devil with the gift of lifting the roofs off houses and showing 
the scenes that are being enacted within, is referenced by the author of ‘Asmodeus, or,  
Strictures on the Glasgow Democrats’ published in the Glasgow Courier in 1793, 1820s 
French periodical Le Diable Boîteux, and Edward Bulwer Lytton in his ‘Asmodeus at Large’ 
series in the New Monthly Magazine in 1833. Tom Wolfe, in defining the ‘New Journalism’ 
of twentieth-century America, notes what struck him most on his first encounter with New 
Journalism—the journalist’s insight into matters that should be beyond his ken (‘I really 
didn’t understand how anyone could manage to do reporting on things like the personal bylay 
between a man and his fourth wife [...] The bastards are making it up!’).21  
As Miller writes ‘omniscient narration assumes a fully panoptic view of the world it 
places under surveillance. Nothing worth knowing escapes its notation, and its complete 
knowledge includes the knowledge that it is always right’. Moreover, ‘there is no other 
perspective on the world than its own, because the world entirely coincides with that 
perspective’.22 But despite the appeal of such complete knowledge and their recurring 
fantasies regarding it, literary journalists have time and again problematised the use of the 
 omniscient perspective so popular in the nineteenth-century novel and instead have celebrated 
the partial, limited view of the individual. Jaffe has characterised this tension between 
omniscience and the partial view in the work of Dickens as a conflict between ‘a desire for 
personal knowledge gained through sympathetic identification’ and ‘a desire for impersonal 
knowledge acquired through surveillance’, but I would argue that to this battle of desires we 
must also add an anxiety regarding surveillance, which the desire for sympathetic 
identification is in some measure a reflection of.23  
Writers such as William Hazlitt and Charles Lamb emphasise the individualism of 
their viewpoints as journalists. Lamb’s ‘Elia’ is self-consciously odd and deliberately places 
himself outwith society’s norms, celebrating his lack of comprehensiveness and the partiality 
of his view. As he writes in the essay ‘Imperfect Sympathies’, he has a mind ‘rather 
suggestive than comprehensive’ and makes ‘no pretences to much clearness and or precision’ 
but instead is ‘content with fragments and scattered pieces of Truth’. He contrasts this with 
the mindset of the Caledonian, which he deplores: ‘The brain of a true Caledonian (if I am not 
mistake) is constituted upon quite a different plan. His Minerva is born in panoply’.24 
‘Panoply’ is just what Lamb avoids; rather his journalism is essayistic, built on ‘speculative, 
informal, impressionistic knowledge, or half-knowledge’.25 As Marilyn Butler states ‘He 
makes no claims that could not have been tested within the scope of one man’s experience’.26 
One man’s experience, moreover, that is resistant to analysis or judgement and evades any 
attempts to pinpoint it. As Simon Hull remarks, Elia changes his birth place from one essay to 
another: ‘The games Elia plays with his own identity [...] are central to the reader’s education. 
A requirement for the reader to see beyond the material and the empirical is implicit in Elia’s 
reflexivity over his own phantasmal existence and the freedom from a fixed, oppressive 
notion of identity’.27  
 Hazlitt’s essays are of quite a different style from those of Lamb but nonetheless speak 
to a ‘restless, sceptical, self-tormenting and doubting [...] individualism’.28 While his early 
efforts are subsumed in the editorial ‘we’ of Leigh Hunt’s Examiner, by the time we reach 
Hazlitt’s most celebrated phase of essay writing for the London Magazine and the New 
Monthly, he is using the first-person pronoun with vigour. In ‘On Gusto’, he notes that there 
is more to art than visual acuity, and that simply recording accurately the visible often leaves 
something lacking:  
Claude’s landscapes, perfect as they are, want gusto. This is not 
easy to explain. They are perfect abstractions of the visible 
images of things; they speak the visible language of nature 
truly. They resemble a mirror or a microscope. To the eye only 
they are more perfect than any other landscapes that ever were 
or will be painted; they give more of nature, as cognizable by 
one sense alone; but they lay an equal stress on all visible 
impressions; they do not interpret one sense by another; they do 
not distinguish the character of different objects as we are 
taught, and can only be taught, to distinguish by their effect on 
the different senses. That is, his eye wanted imagination:  it did 
not strongly sympathize with his other faculties. He saw the 
atmosphere, but he did not feel it.29  
Feeling is more important than seeing for Hazlitt. The microscopic gaze is to no purpose 
without imagination or sympathy. ‘I never saw any thing more terrific than his aspect just 
before he fell’, he writes in ‘The Fight’, combining observation and his own individual 
feeling regarding his observation.30  
 Moving forward to the mid-nineteenth-century, while there are numerous examples of 
journalists indulging in omniscient fantasies, those fantasies rarely remain uncomplicated. Or, 
in the instance of Charles Collins’s ‘Our Eyewitness’ articles in All the Year Round, 
punctured. Consider the language used in this preamble to one of his reports:  
Our Eye-witness has spent the greater part of two days in a 
careful examination of the Royal Arsenal, at Woolwich.  
Before proceeding to enter into any description of what he saw 
on the occasion of this visit, the writer wishes to record here his 
sense of the obligation he is under to Colonel Tulloh, and the 
other officers and gentlemen engaged in the superintendence of 
the different departments, for their readiness to facilitate his 
examination of the place, and to afford him every assistance 
which lay in their power towards forming a correct idea of the 
resources of this splendid arsenal.31  
Collins uses words such as ‘examination’, ‘record’, ‘superintendence’, ‘department’, and 
‘correct’—words which suggest or directly reference the three key elements of Foucault’s 
disciplinary power: hierarchical observation, normalising judgment and examination.  ‘Our 
Eye-witness’ is often reduced to his function of observation, as the titling of the series might 
suggest. In the series opener, he is described as ‘simply an observant gentleman who goes 
about with his eyes and ears open, who notes everything that comes in his way’.32 ‘Notes 
everything’ is an important phrase here.  
Yet the Eye-witness’s perspective is far from omniscient and in fact his pretensions to 
such a vantage point are often lampooned in the series. Instead his viewpoint is the limited 
viewpoint of the street. For example: ‘There is always a certain interest attached to the private 
 life of great public characters; so your Eye-witness, who happened to be passing, stopped and 
joined the knot of spectators, thinking that he, too, would like to see this performer emerge 
from his lodgings’.33 Here is no Asmodean ability to see through walls or view the interior of 
others’ lives, but rather a man on the street, on tip-toes struggling to see through the crowd. A 
man with a name that suggests the very opposite of clarity and transparency: Mr. David 
Fudge. A name, furthermore, which may have invoked for contemporary readers Thomas 
Moore’s epistolary verse novel, The Fudge Family in Paris (1818), and their ‘inane 
descriptions’ of their travels.34 But most importantly, a single man with a partial, subjective 
outlook, which renders Collins’s rather laborious play with the second and third-person 
perspectives an exercise in unsubtle comedy and Our Eye-witness’s occasional alignment of 
his role with that of ‘officers and gentlemen’ gently absurd.  
Moreover, the subjectivism of Our Eye-witness’s perspective not only gently ridicules 
any pretensions to hierarchical oversight but at the same time shows up the limitations of such 
a view.  Of the Arsenal at Woolwich, a perfect example of the kind of disciplinary institution 
that Foucault discusses, Our Eye-witness remarks ‘the healthy tone and activity pervading the 
whole place’, only to comment that it is the result of ‘a condition of affairs precisely the 
reverse’. Throughout the entire article, he is keen to contrast objective examination of 
industrial process with his imaginative sense that for all the healthy productivity on view, this 
is a place of ‘destruction’, ‘cruelty’, and ‘carnage’.35  
Collins’s contemporary Thackeray also celebrates the individual perspective in his 
journalism. ‘Linea recta brevissima’ he writes in ‘On Two Children in Black’, ‘That right line 
"I" is the very shortest, simplest, straightforwardest means of communication between us, and 
stands for what it is worth and no more [...] and although these are Roundabout Papers, and 
may wander who knows whither, I shall ask leave to maintain the upright and simple 
 perpendicular’.36 Thackeray as a journalist is circulatory (‘wander[ing] who knows whither’), 
he is ironic in the true sense of the word, leaving meaning blurred and unresolved (‘stands for 
what it is worth and no more’), and he is resolutely personal. As with Wolfe a century later, 
he flouts the notion of ‘the pale beige tone’ and instead exudes ‘personality, energy, drive, 
bravura’ or as Hazlitt would have it, ‘gusto’.37 Moreover, in ‘On Letts’s Diary’, he does not 
simply celebrate the individual but critiques the alternative, contrasting the all-knowing 
narrative of the newspaper with its linear discipline with the partial, subjective narrative of his 
individual viewpoint. The newspaper account of Sir Richmond Shakespear’s life and death, as 
Thackeray recounts it, is as follows:  
‘For thirty-two years,’ the paper says, ‘Sir Richmond  
Shakespear faithfully and devotedly served the Government of 
India, and during that period but once visited England, for a 
few months and on public duty. In his military capacity he saw 
much service, was present in eight general engagements, and 
was badly wounded in the last. In 1840, when a young 
lieutenant, he had the rare good fortune to be the means of 
rescuing from almost hopeless slavery in Khiva 416 subjects of 
the Emperor of Russia; and, but two years later, greatly 
contributed to the happy recovery of our own prisoners from a 
similar fate in Cabul. Throughout his career this officer was 
ever ready and zealous for the public service, and freely risked 
life and liberty in the discharge of his duties. Lord Canning, to 
mark his high sense of Sir Richmond Shakespear's public 
services, had lately offered him the Chief Commissionership of 
 Mysore, which he had accepted, and was about to undertake, 
when death terminated his career’. 38  
Compare this with Thackeray’s own perspective on his cousin’s life and death:  
We were first-cousins; had been little playmates and friends 
from the time of our birth; and the first house in London to 
which I was taken, was that of our aunt, the mother of his  
Honor the Member of Council. His Honor was even then a  
gentleman of the long robe, being, in truth, a baby in arms. We 
Indian children were consigned to a school of which our 
deluded parents had heard a favorable report, but which was 
governed by a horrible little tyrant, who made our young lives 
so miserable that I remember kneeling by my little bed of a 
night, and saying, ‘Pray God, I may dream of my mother!’  
Thence we went to a public school; and my cousin to  
Addiscombe and to India.39  
In one, his cousin is a rescuer of slaves, in the other a slave to ‘a horrible little tyrant’.  In one 
account he is the discipliner, in the other the disciplined. More significantly, one is 
comprehensive, categorical and moralistic, positing Thackeray’s cousin’s life as a model of 
public duty, while the other is intimate and fragmented, focusing on a moment rather than the 
whole.  It is clear from the manner in which he juxtaposes the accounts which Thackeray 
prefers and that for Thackeray, paradoxically, the comprehensive account needs the fragment 
to make it whole, for it is in the fragment that we find the emotional truth of Richmond 
Shakespear’s death.  
 Similarly, despite his dreams of ‘Shadows’ and despite the two writers’ disagreements 
over the ‘dignity of literature’, the majority of Dickens’s journalism is also written from the 
perspective of the individual on or in the scene. Take for example the first paper in his 
‘Uncommercial Traveller’ series:  
The tide was on the flow, and had been for some two hours and 
a half; there was a slight obstruction in the sea within a few 
yards of my feet: as if the stump of a tree, with earth enough 
about it to keep it from lying horizontally on the water, had 
slipped a little from the land—and as I stood upon the beach and 
observed it dimpling the light swell that was coming in, I cast a 
stone over it.40   
With phrases such as ‘a few yards from my feet’ Dickens quickly establishes his place in the 
scene. However, not only is he in the scene but he is interacting with it—‘I cast a stone over 
it’. He is a participant as well as an observer. Moreover, he also establishes the tenor of his 
observation through his contemplative focus on the movements of the water.  
At times, like ‘Our Eye-witness’, he takes the position of the unknowing bystander. In 
‘Some Recollections of Mortality’, he aligns himself with a crowd waiting outside the Paris 
Morgue:  
Shut out in the muddy street, we now became quite ravenous to 
know all about it.  Was it river, pistol, knife, love, gambling, 
robbery, hatred, how many stabs, how many bullets, fresh or 
decomposed, suicide or murder?  All wedged together, and all 
staring at one another with our heads thrust forward, we 
propounded these inquiries and a hundred more such.41  
 At other times, he takes on the role of inspector, but never without introducing a note of 
discomfort. In ‘A Small Star in the East’, he brags about his abilities as an observer, ‘I could 
take in all these things without appearing to notice them, and could even correct my 
inventory’, and places himself in the role of impartial, all-seeing judge, only be 
discountenanced by the fact that ‘A child stood looking on’, noting that ‘I could enter no 
other houses for that one while, for I could not bear the contemplation of the children’.42  
Dickens is almost always both an observer and a participant in the scene. Jaffe argues 
that this is due to a desire for personal knowledge that competes with his desire for 
omniscience, resulting in the creation of narrators that she calls ‘semi-omniscient’. But for 
Jaffe, ‘Individual sympathy is encouraged but also evaded’ in Boz, while later work in 
Household Words fails to ‘personalize – to domesticate, as its title suggests – the vast 
machinery of the industrial age by presenting scientific and statistical information 
informally’, which amounts to much the same thing. The very notion of investigation for  
Jaffe suggests a distance that works against sympathy.43  
It seems evident, however, that the incitement of emotion, of going beyond the simply 
visible, of approaching his subjects with ‘gusto’, was Dickens’s intent. In the introductory 
paper to the ‘Uncommercial Traveller’, he makes this purpose clear:  
It was the kind and wholesome face I have made mention of as 
being then beside me, that I had purposed to myself to see, 
when I left home for Wales.  I had heard of that clergyman, as 
having buried many scores of the shipwrecked people; of his 
having opened his house and heart to their agonised friends; of 
his having used a most sweet and patient diligence for weeks 
and weeks, in the performance of the forlornest offices that 
 Man can render to his kind; of his having most tenderly and 
thoroughly devoted himself to the dead, and to those who were 
sorrowing for the dead.  I had said to myself, ‘In the Christmas 
season of the year, I should like to see that man!’44   
Having read in the newspaper of the shipwreck, he comes to see it himself in order to witness 
it emotionally and to provide an account that will view the scene through the lens of feeling, 
and which will note sorrow and tenderness and ‘sweet and patient diligence’.  
  
The Discipline of Sympathy   
Hunter S. Thompson is jauntily defiant when he proclaims that  
When a jackrabbit gets addicted to road-running, it is only a 
matter of time before he gets smashed—and when a journalist 
turns into a politics junkie he will sooner or later start raving 
and babbling in print about things that only a person who has  
Been There can possibly understand.45  
For Thompson this comes down to a choice between providing a ‘cinematic reel-record of 
what the campaign was like at the time’ or giving his readers ‘what the whole thing boiled 
down to or how it fits into history’.46 Those of us who were not there may never be able to 
fully comprehend his prose  but his opaque rendering of the scene is the closest we can get to 
the experience of it, to an understanding that goes beyond outcomes and consequences and 
‘the whole thing boiled down’. In other words, it is the closest we will come to the feeling of 
it and the kind of knowledge that accompanies sensation, participation and the street-level 
view.  
 Thompson and the other twentieth-century New Journalists are in themselves a worthy 
case study for looking at the relationship between journalism and the disciplinary gaze, but 
they differ in significant ways from the nineteenth-century journalists discussed in this article. 
First, they actually enact their fantasies of omniscience in their journalism. Second, while 
feeling is key with both, the relationship between feeling and judgement in their works is less 
clear—just who is being disciplined and how is a much murkier subject than with, for 
example, Hazlitt, who in ‘The Fight’ openly proclaims the target of his discourse. ‘Ladies!’, 
he writes,  ‘it is to you I dedicate this description; nor let it seem out of character for the fair 
to notice the exploits of the brave. Courage and modesty are the old  
English virtues, and may they never look cold and askance on one another!’47  
The adoption of the individual perspective is, for the journalists examined here, not simply a 
matter of aesthetics, but rather of morality. Lamb in eschewing the all-inclusive vision of the 
‘Caledonian’ states:  
Between the affirmative and the negative there is no borderland 
with him. You cannot hover with him upon the confines of 
truth, or wander in the maze of a probable argument. He always 
keeps the path. You cannot make excursions with him—for he 
sets you right. His taste never fluctuates. His morality never 
abates. He cannot compromise, or understand middle actions.  
There can be but a right and a wrong.48  
The Caledonian mindset is the result of a flawed morality, the rigidity and starkness of which 
Lamb objects to. Lamb’s writing instead wanders and hesitates, revelling not just in halftruths 
but untruths, in the murky ground between right and wrong. The idea of human beings living 
in ‘perfect sympathy’ with each other is, for Lamb, fantastical, but what sympathy we can 
 garner for our fellows can only live outside of the all-encompassing severity of the 
Caledonian.   
Similarly, John Hollingshead writes of viewing the city from above:  
[F]rom such a place, the roar, the accumulated voice of the 
great city—lifted up in its joy, its labour, its sorrow, its vice, 
and its suffering—sounds as the sharp cry of agony issuing 
from the mouths of men who are chained, within the hateful 
bounds, by imaginary wants and artificial desires; yet it fills the 
heart with no more sense of pity than the united plaint of 
lowsighing pain coming from the wretched flies on yonder 
besmeared fly-catcher.49  
As Richard Maxwell notes, omniscience and human feeling are hard to reconcile and feeling 
was important to nineteenth-century writers.50 Hazlitt’s opinion on the subject of feeling and 
art we have already seen in relations to his comments on ‘gusto’ and Hollingshead’s are made 
evident in the passage quoted above.  ‘That fusion of the graces of imagination to the realities 
of life’ was the driving thrust of Dickens’s magazines Household Words and All the Year  
Round.51 In making his case for his preference for writers such as Michel de Montaigne and 
James B. Howel, Thackeray writes that it is because of the emotional truth of their 
individualism.   
I hope I shall always like to hear men, in reason, talk about 
themselves. What subject does a man know better? If I stamp 
on a friend's corn, his outcry is genuine—he confounds my 
clumsiness in the accents of truth. He is speaking about himself 
 and expressing his emotion of grief or pain in a manner 
perfectly authentic and veracious.52  
Individualism’s value is in the authenticity of the emotion it communicates.  There is no truth 
without feeling. Moreover, feeling, alongside irony and digression, is a way of resisting the 
disciplinary nature of industrial society and the shift towards transparency and knowability 
that Lamb scorns in ‘Imperfect Sympathies’ and that Dickens shudders from in ‘A Fly-Leaf 
in a Life’.53  
However, feeling and its corollary sympathy, and their employment in literature, are in 
themselves deeply disciplinary. As Fonna Forman-Barzilai notes, traditional theories of 
sympathy resonate deeply with Foucault’s description of socially-disciplined norms and 
disciplinary power.54 Adam Smith’s account, being the premier example, tells of two people, 
a spectator and an agent. The spectator observes the agent, and imagines her/himself in the 
same situation and what s/he would feel in that situation. He holds that in the process of 
sympathising with another person, ‘we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him’.55  Smith goes on to discuss how the agent internalises the 
spectator, imagining the gaze of others upon her/him even when there is no one there to 
observe the agent’s actions and how the agent modifies her/his behaviour accordingly. 
Sympathy can thus be seen as a two-part ‘dramatic social practice’, the second stage of which  
is discipline, or ‘the impact that the spectator’s surveillance and judgement have upon the 
agent, the extent to which they motivate him to modify his conduct, and ultimately, through 
repetition, become a member of a moral culture’.56 By encouraging their readers to practice a 
sympathetic outlook on the world then, these journalists are encouraging them to turn the 
disciplinary gaze inwards, to imagine someone always watching and judging their conduct. 
 They are encouraging the normalisation that their individual stance and their cultivation of 
eccentricity would seem to reject.  
For example, let us return to Thackeray’s article on his cousin’s death. Here is how he 
concludes the piece:  
I write down his name in my little book, among those of others 
dearly loved, who, too, have been summoned hence. And so we 
meet and part; we struggle and succeed; or we fail and drop 
unknown on the way. As we leave the fond mother's knee, the 
rough trials of childhood and boyhood begin; and then 
manhood is upon us, and the battle of life, with its chances, 
perils, wounds, defeats, distinctions. And Fort William guns are 
saluting in one man's honor, while the troops are firing the last 
volleys over the other's grave—over the grave of the brave, the 
gentle, the faithful Christian soldier.57  
After mocking the narrative of public duty and heroics that the newspaper spun about his 
cousin—‘His Honor was even then a gentleman of the long robe, being, in truth, a baby in 
arms’—Thackeray constructs his own narrative with its own moral message, which in fact, 
does not stray that far from the original, praising almost the same characteristics as the other 
narrative of his death. Thackeray’s tale however is an emotional one, resonant with private 
grief. It attempts to play on the reader’s sympathy and thus involves the reader in a process of 
imagination, judgement and internalisation of norms.  
Or, let us look once again at Hazlitt’s ‘The Fight’. As David Higgins has shown, there 
was much journalistic attention paid to prize fighting in the 1820s. Hazlitt’s editor pictured 
the article as ‘a depiction of “existing manners”. Soon to become a mere record of our past 
 barbarities’.58 Hazlitt however sought to make his readership sympathise with the fighters, to 
make them turn back their judgemental gaze on themselves and finding themselves wanting.  
All traces of life, of natural expression, were gone from him. 
His face was like a human skull, a death’s head, spouting 
blood. The eyes were filled with blood, the nose streamed with 
blood, the mouth gaped blood [...] Yet he fought on after this 
for several rounds, still striking the first desperate blow, [...] it 
was not till the Gas-man was so stunned in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth round, that his sense forsook him, and he could not 
come to time, that the battle was declared over. Yet whose 
despise the FANCY, do something to shew as much pluck, or 
as much self-possession as this, before you assume a 
superiority which you have never given a single proof of by 
any one action in the whole course of your lives!59  
Here Hazlitt marks the purpose of his description quite clearly. He engages the reader in 
the scene and in the fighter’s situation through visceral physical descriptions that play 
upon the emotions in order that he might then turn any potential judgement round upon 
the reader. He makes the reader pity the man and then turns that back on the reader. If 




Mark Andrejevic writes ‘What takes place in early 20th-century mass society, according to 
such an account, is not the op-down silencing of the masses, but the probing, observation, and 
 measurement of the citizenry’. Further, ‘[t]he rise of the so-called objective journalism, to the 
extent that it shies away from what it construes as setting or shaping the “agenda” and turns 
instead to the pseudo-social science of polling-based horse race coverage, facilitates this 
process’.60 But can we say anything different of ‘subjective’ journalism? Does it not similarly 
map the citizenry? Is this a paradox similar to that posed by Gayatri Spivak when she talks of 
the subaltern?61 Perhaps just as Western academic approaches to the ‘third world’ are 
inescapably colonial, so also, by its nature, journalism is necessarily disciplinary. Even at its 
most subjective, contained firmly within the limits of the individual perspective, and focused 
upon the least quantifiable of factors, is its mission not to probe society? Even at its most 
ironic, does it not seek to make something more visible to its readers? It may conceal, as 
Steiner suggests, but it also communicates.62 It cannot completely resist transparency, nor 
even seek to.  
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